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1955] p ATENTS AND ANTITRUST 
PATENTS AND ANTITRUST: PEACEFUL 
COEXISTENCE?* 
S. Chesterfield Oppenheimt 
199 
SPECIALISTS in patent law and antitrust law have become in-creasingly aware of the interactions of patent and antitrust poli-
cies. The view that these two sets of laws intrinsica.Jly _conflict still 
persists, although it is apparently a minority position.1 It is based 
on the idea that the very exclusiveness of patent rights breeds anti-
competitive effects. In this connection, the patent bar is sometimes 
charged with putting the gloss of history and theory on the 
monopolistic nature of patented inventions.2 
The report of the Attorney General's Committee3 senses no 
inherent opposition between these two public policies. It sub-
scribes to the view that they both flow from the fountainhead of 
competitive enterprise and are mutual aids to its preservation. 
• This article was originally prepared as an address before the joint meeting of the 
Section of Patent, Trade-Mark and Copyright Law and the Section of Antitrust Law of 
the American Bar Association at its 78th Annual Meeting at Philadelphia, August 22, 1955. 
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1 For expressions of this viewpoint, see Hamilton and Till, "What Is a Patent?" 13 
LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 245 (1948); Meyers and Lewis, "The Patent 'Franchise' and the 
Antitrust Laws," 30 GEo. L.J. 117, 260 (1941-1942); Petro, "Patents: Judicial Develop-
ments and Legislative Proposals," 12 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 80, 352 (1944-1945). But see 
Folk, "The Relation of Patents to the Antitrust Laws," 13 LAW & CoNTEM. PROB. 278 
(1948); Stedman, "Patents and the Antitrust Laws," 31 J.P.0.S. 14 (1949); WooD, PATENTS 
AND ANTITRUST LAW (1942); Rich, "Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-
Monopoly Laws," 24 J.P.O.S. 85, 159, 241, 328, 422 (1942); Wood and Johnson, "Patents 
and the Antitrust Laws," UNIV. Iu.. L. FORUM 544 (1950); OPPENHEIM, CASES oN FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAws 482-491 (1948), and articles by the same author cited note 98 infra; 
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL Cm.IMl'ITE!> TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 
223-259 (1955). 
In his dissenting opinion in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 
452, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1944), Justice Rutledge said: "Basically these [patent laws and antitrust 
laws] are opposed in policy, the one granting rights of monopoly, the other forbidding 
monopolistic activities." A former head of the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice has expressed a similar view. Bergson, "Patents and Antitrust Laws," Practising 
Law Institute Lecture, July 20, 1949, at p. 3 (Mimeo.): "It will be helpful in our thinking 
on the subject if we face frankly the fact that these two systems do conflict. It only 
confuses the issue if we shut our eyes and pretend they do not." But compare Clapp, 
"Some Recent Developments in Patent-Antitrust Laws," 34 J.P.O.S. 945 at 946 (1952) ("I 
think it must be conceded that the concept of free competition is at least to a certain 
degree in conflict with that of the patent monopoly"); and to the same effect, Hollabaugh, 
"Recent Antitrust Developments Affecting Patents," UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAw SCHOOL 
INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 61, 63 (1953). 
2 E.g., Kahn, "Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent Law," 30 Al\r. EcoN. 
REv. 475 (1940); Hamilton, "Patents and Free Enterprise," TNEC Monograph No. 31 
(1941); Rice, "Decay of Our Patent System," 5 BROOKLYN L. REv. 357 (1936). 
3 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST 
LAws, c. V (1955) (hereinafter referred to as the REPORT). 
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Yet this does not necessarily deny the existence, in certain respects, 
of a division-with patent law as one branch and antitrust as the 
other. Thus, the report affirms that in some zones each of these 
bodies of law has its own measures of liability for policy transgres-
sions. An example is the report's assertion that patent misuse is 
not invariably per se an antitrust violation.4 
In the year 1955 it is still clear tliat patent and antitrust policies 
must be kept within their respective orbits. This requires sound 
administration of their statutory standards and the intervention 
of judicial interpretations designed to harmonize both policies 
with the paramount goal of promoting competition. It is futile to 
controvert the existence of patent-antitrust problems analyzed in 
the report of the Attorney General's Committee. It has been 
contended that the courts really do not resolve incompatibilities 
of these policies but rather define the line where patent protection 
ends and antitrust prohibition begins.5 This smacks of taking 
semantic refuge in question-begging terms. The inescapable judi-
cial task has been and will be one of reconciling private rights 
within the patent law and antitrust sectors with the overriding 
public interest in both areas. This is true in any situation when 
the patentee is challenged for claiming competitive immunity based 
upon invalid patents or for overreaching the bounds of his valid 
patent grant in collision with antitrust standards. Indeed, an ac-
commodation would still be needed if the antitrust laws did not 
exist. Ever since the first Patent Act of I 790, 6 the courts have been 
required to determine the scope of the patent grant in order to 
prevent the restriction of rights in which the public at large is 
entitled to share.7 
It is timely to take stock of congressional and judicial atti-
tudes toward patent rights in the larger setting of private competi-
tive enterprise policies of which antitrust is an integral part. This 
paper is limited to aspects directly and substantially related to the 
legal status and protection of patent rights from the standpoint of 
their business utilization, and from the standpoint of their immu-
nity from, or impact upon, antitrust prohibitions. There are many 
technical patent law problems of no antitrust relevance just as 
4 REPORT 254. 
5 Diggins, "The Patent-Antitrust Problem," 53 M1cH. L. REv. 1093 (1955). 
6 Act of April 10, 1790, c. 7, 1 Stat. L. 109. 
7For illustrative early cases, see Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 1 (1829); Grant 
v. Raymond, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 218 (1832); Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. (45 U.S.) 645 (1846); 
Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. (62 U.S.) 322 (1858); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 
2 S.Ct. 225 (1882). 
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there are antitrust issues of no patent law significance. These lie 
outside the scope of this discussion. 
My thesis for this paper is based upon developments which 
appear, as of 1955, to bring into clearer focus the process by which 
the earned differential advantages of patent rights are being ad-
justed to the prohibitory dixits of antitrust law. This is part of 
the never-ending governmental function of balancing stability of 
legal rights against the desired flexibility resulting from evolu-
tionary growth. We can only chart the directions of the current 
trends. Generalizations from this panorama should not be over-
drawn or artificially simplified. Both the patent and antitrust 
spectra are arranged in degrees. The edges of certainty are blurred 
in areas where the law continues to adjust itself to technological 
economic growth. Despite these caveats, however, I do not mean 
to underrate the increased clarification of the appointed provinces 
of patent and antitrust policies. This clarification is emerging from 
what has occurred since the 1930's when patent laws and the Patent 
System began to be subjected to accusations of organic deficiencies 
in their underlying theory and operations-criticisms that went 
beyond instances of misuse of patent rights.8 
Let us begin this synthesis with some generalizations and 
searching questions. At the same time let us bear in mind that the 
patent-antitrust picture is seen through contracted vision because 
opinion necessarily· mixes with demonstrable facts in the value 
judgments any observer may make.9 • 
First, the judicial trend in the main shows rejection of assaults 
upon the fundamentals of the patent grant. Congress and the 
courts still regard the patent as a public welfare monopoly which 
is limited in time and scope in order to keep it geared to the 
mechanisms of competition. An exception to this trend is the 
mutation of doctrine with respect to the standards of invention. 
s See Hamilton, "Patents and Free Enterprise," TNEC Monograph No. 31 (1941); 
Petro, "Patents: Judicial Developments and Legislative Proposals," 12 UNIV. Cm:. L. R.Ev. 
80, 352 (1944-1945): Rice, "Decay of Our Patent System," 5 BROOKLYN L. REv. 357 (1936); 
Feuer, "The Patent Privilege and the TNEC Proposals," 14 TEMPLE L.Q. 180 (1940); 
Frank, "What's Wrong With Our Patent System?" SAT. EVE. PoST, Nov. 28, 1942; Kahn, 
"Fundamental Deficiencies of the American Patent Law," 30 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 475 (1940); 
Ogburn and Thomas, "Are Inventions Inevitable?" 37 POL. Sci. Q. 83 (1922); GILFILLAN, 
THE SocIOLOGY OF INVENTION (1935); Gilfillan, "Social Principles of Invention," 17 J.P.O.S. 
216 (1935); Arnold, "The Abuse of Patents," 24 J.P.O.S. 531 (1942) [but see Langner, "We 
Depend on Inventions, An Answer to Thurman Arnold," 24 J.P.O.S. 545 (1942)]; Watkins 
and Stocking, "Patent Monopolies and Free Enterprise," 3 VAND. L. R.Ev. 729 (1950). 
9 Footnote documentation of the author's conclusions is supplied in other parts of this 
article. 
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Second, there is a trend toward the intermediate position that, 
in balancing patents and antitrust, patents are not to be viewed 
either as the root of all evils or the source of all benefits in main-
taining the goal of a creative competitive society. 
Third, certain rulings of the courts have been made in the 
shadowy areas where solution of novel and borderland issues of 
patent-antitrust policies are more likely to be exploratory and 
tentative rather than the crystallization of long-run doctrinal direc-
tions of either of these public policy branches. 
Fourth, there recently appears to be greater sophistication in 
administration and enforcement of patent and antitrust policies. 
This may be the pathway to separating from the proper functions 
of government, within constitutional and statutory bounds, the 
ideological criticism which brings into question premises of the 
patent laws and the Patent System. Government antitrust agencies 
and the courts are awakening to this tendency to avoid the circum-
vention of the law's commands which results from the espousal of 
patent and antitrust reforms which should be left to Congress. 
These characterizations of trends are the basis for inviting 
attention to certain fundament~l considerations which appear to 
underlie the accommodation of patent rights to antitrust doctrines 
within the range of each of the foregoing conclusions. These are 
phrased as guiding questions which this paper seeks to answer. 
One question is whether patent rights are receiving "hard core" 
legal protection consonant with constitutional and statutory edicts 
of patent policy and hence not contrary to antitrust criteria-that 
is to say, whether the courts have given effect to the standards of 
invention which Congress intended to be compatible with the 
constitutional purpose, and whether, after the patent issues, they 
'have tended to accord patent rights the full measure of reward 
within the ambit of valid patent grants. 
Another question is whether patent policy enforcement against 
misuse and antitrust enforcement against patent abuses have been 
generally kept within the bounds of "hard core" violations of each 
policy. 
Next, on the frontiers where novel issues constantly arise, have 
the courts kept faith with both patent and antitrust axioms with-
out inhibiting the growth of the law and its capacity to conform 
itself to dynamic- forces? 
Finally, have the branches of law under discussion been canal-
ized within banks to keep patent and antitrust from overflowing 
into ideologies beyond congressional directives? In other words, 
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have the courts avoided premises and standards of ideologies at 
odds with those embodied in our private competitive system? 
In explaining these trends and in answering these questions 
we turn to the evidence at hand. 
"Hard Core" Protection 
Despite some striking attempts to cut out the heart of patent 
rights, there is no substantial evidence of a drift away from judicial 
protection of the "hard core" of the patent grant. This conclusion 
may surprise the reader at first because a few dramatic deviations 
from traditional safeguards of patent rights, or judicial dicta, may 
have deflected attention from the march qf decisional law and the 
facts of particular cases. A. dispassionate examination of judicial 
trends since the 1930's will disclose few breaches in patent law 
policy. In this appraisal we must exclude every adjudicated case 
where the court found genuine patent misuse or antitrust abuse,10 
since these do not shrink the legitimate sphere of lawful patent 
rights. 
The following illustrations highlight the previously stated gen-
eralization that the beating drums of the critics have not persuaded 
the Supreme Court and other federal courts, or the Congress, that 
the limited time monopoly exclusiveness of the patent grant tends 
to undermine the foundations of a competitive economy. 
There is no decision, apart from the effects of compulsion to 
license as an antitrust remedy in litigated or consent decrees, in 
direct contradiction of the historic concept of the patent grant as 
conferring the right to exclude everyone from making, using or 
vending the patented invention without permission of the patentee. 
Section 154 of the Patent Act of 195211 now removes any doubt 
that this right of exclusion was always intended as an addition to 
the common law primordial right of an inventor to make, use and 
sell the invention. The code explicitly provides that every patent 
shall contain " . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, 
for the term of seventeen years, of the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States .... " 
In recent years there has been questioning of the concept of 
the patent as a property right. This came from writers who pre-
ferred the notion that the patent is "a private stake in the public 
10 See notes 52-69 infra. 
1135 u.s.c. (1952) §154. 
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domain,"12 a public franchise, or a certificate of convenience and 
necessity,13 as in the public utility regulation field. You will not 
find any unequivocal judicial countenance of these heresies. 
Standing firm is the Supreme Court's affirmation in Hartford 
Empire: "That a patent is property, protected against appropria-
tion both by individuals and the government, has long been set-
tled."14 This should render ineffectual any attempt to devitalize 
this property concept by capitalizing on the frequent Supreme 
Court references to the patent as a privilege conditioned by a 
public purpose.15 It also subordinates vacillations in Justice 
Douglas' characterizations on this point, in wliich Justice Black 
concurred. In Special Equipment Company/6 Justice Douglas 
observed that a patent is not to be considered as just another form 
of property, but two years later in Transparent-Wrap,11 he flatly 
asserted that a patent is a species of property. Again, to .remove all 
doubt, the Patent Act of 1952 added a declaratory provision that 
"patents shall have the attributes of personal property."18 
Congressional intention to translate the precepts of the con-
stitutional provision into patent" fundamentals traces its ancestry 
to the. first law of 1790 and its descendants.19 Despite the ever 
present risk that the courts may misread congressional intention 
in the revised paragraphs of this latest act, there is cogent evidence 
that Congress has placed itself on the side of "hard core" protec-
tion of the patent grant. This should counteract the denuding 
effect attributed to a few judicial frolics and detours of which Con-
gress apparently took notice in making certain revisions designed 
to remove obscurities. 
12 Hamilton, "Patents and Free Enterprise," TNEC Monograph No. 31 at p. 51 
(1941). 
18 Meyers and Lewis, "The Patent 'Franchise' and the Antitrust Laws," 30 GEo. L. J. 
II7, 260 (1941-1942): and see concurring opinion of Frank, J., in Picard v. United Aircraft 
Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 632 at 645. 
14 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 415, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1944). For 
early cases, see Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. (45 U.S.) 645 at 674 (1846); Consolidated 
Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92 at 96 (1876). 
15 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid•Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 at 666, 64 S.Ct. 268 
(1944); Douglas, J., dissenting in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 at 382, 65 
S.Ct. 741 (1945). Cf. description of patents as "public franchises" in Seymour v. Osborne, 
II Wall. (78 U.S.) 516 at 533 (1870). . 
16 Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 65 S.Ct. 741 (1945). 
17 Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes 8: Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 67 S.Ct. 610 
(1947). 
18 35 u.s.c. (1952) §261. 
19 For discussions of legislation prior to the 1952 Patent Code, and of legislative 
history and intent behind the 1952 code, see Federico, "Commentary on the New Patent 
Act," 35 U.S.C.A. I-70 (1954); Harris, "Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent 
of the Patent Act of 1952," 23 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 658 (1955), 
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One group of such revised provisions relates to what is inven-
tion and the cognate presumption of validity upon issuance of the 
patent grant.20 These have special pertinence to possible anti-
trust implications. It is axiomatic that an invalid patent cannot 
be used to exclude others from the practice or marketing of the 
invention.21 Since an invalid patent has no legal inception, the 
conduct of the claimant, subsequent to knowledge of invalidity, 
must be tested by antitrust standards applicable to unpatented sub-
ject matter. This may convert into antitrust violation conduct 
that would otherwise have been reasonably ancillary to a lawful 
patent grant. For this reason,_ crucial importance attaches to a 
determination of patent validity and the adjunct presumption of 
validity arising from issuance of the grant. 
A key provision is section I 03 of the new code entitled "Con-
ditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter."22 This 
section states two criteria of invention not previously made explicit. 
First, there is a clear statutory bar to obtaining a patent on subject 
matter which "would have been obvious at the time the invention 
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art." Second, 
there is the mandate that "patentability shall not be negatived by 
the manner in which the invention was made." 
The House Report referred to section I 03 as one of two "major 
changes or innovations"23 in the former law. Nonobviousness as 
a negative test of invention was doubtless intended to reduce the 
mysticism of what constitutes invention. It still remains to be 
seen whether this part of the revised section offers words of promise 
only to be broken by misconceived judicial interpretation.24 More 
20 35 u.s.c. (1952) §282. 
21 Cf. the licensee estoppel cases, in which the Supreme Court has created an exception 
to the usual rule estopping patent licensees from challenging validity of the licensed 
patents, where the license involves a price fixing provision. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson 
Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 63 S.Ct. 172 (1942); Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic 
Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 67 S.Ct. 416 (1947); MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. 
Co., 329 U.S. 402, 67 S.Ct. 421 (1947). As stated by the Court in the Sola case (at 175), 
"a restriction [in a patent license agreement] on the price of articles entering interstate 
commerce is a violation of the Sherman Act save only as it is within the protection of a 
lawfully granted patent monopoly." And d. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 
333 U.S. 364 at 386, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1947) ("Appellees admit that in the absence of whatever 
protection is afforded by valid patents the licensing arrangements described would be in 
violation of the Sherman Act."). 
22 35 U.S.C. (1952) §103. Analysis of this provision is presented in Schramm, "The 
Relationship of the Patent Act of 1952 to the Antitrust Laws," 23 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 36 
at 43-47 (1954); Federico, "Commentary on the New Patent Act,'' 35 U.S.C.A. I at 19-23 
(1954); Harris, "Some Aspects of the Underlying Intent of the Patent Act of 1952,'' 23 
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 658 at 671-680 (1955). 
23 H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 5 (1952). 
24 Opinions containing statements to the effect that Congress merely codified existing 
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objective in character is the sentence of section I 03 which is de-
signed to lay at rest the ghost of the "flash of creative genius" test, 
enunciated by Justice Douglas in the Cuno case,25 and made more 
ominous by his misreading of history and his flight toward pure 
subjectivity of invention in the Great A & P case.26 On this point, 
in the words of the House Report, "it is immaterial whether [ an 
invention] resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a 
flash of genius."27 . There is impelling evidence that Congress in-
tended to stabilize the concept of invention. It was aware of the 
overly critical judicial attitµde toward patent validity reflected in 
Cuno and Great A & P and the rash of decisions labeled by Judge 
Learned Hand as a "pronounced new doctrinal trend"28 toward a 
higher standard of invention. The House Report declared that 
section 103 "should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great 
departures which have appeared in some cases. " 29 More promise, 
and certainly not a broken hope, is foreshadowed in Judge Learned 
Hand's most recent observation on section 103 in Lyon v. Bausch 
& Lomb Optical Co.80 With characteristic grasp of the judicial 
process, he_ said: 
. "In the first place § 103 only restores the original gloss, 
substantially in ipsissimis verbis; which has never been over-
ruled; but on the contrary for seventy or eighty years had 
decisional law with respect to the applicable standard of invention are collected in Harris, 
"Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act of 1952," 23 GEO. 
WASH. L. R.Ev. 658 at 661, n. 14 (1955). See also Interstate Rubber Products Corp. v. 
Radiator Specialty Co., (4th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 546 at 549 ("As stated in the Senate 
and House Reports during the enactment of the statute by Congress and in recent decisions 
of the courts, the provisions of §103 merely codified the law laid down by the courts 
during the past hundred years, and were added to the statute for purposes of uniformity 
and definiteness."). 
25 Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 62 S.Ct. 37 (1941). 
26 Great Atlantic &: Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 
71 S.Ct. 127 (1950). 
27 H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 18 (1952). For earlier judicial comment to the 
same effect, see Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. (18 U.S.) 248 at 269 (1851). 
28 Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 632 at 636. For collection 
of Supreme Court cases invalidating patents for lack of invention in the 1933-1938 period, 
see dissenting opinion of Judge Edgerton in Carbide &: Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. Coe, 
(D.C. Cir. 1938) 102 F. (2d) 236 at 245, n. 10. Cases subsequent to 1938 frequently cited 
as raising the standard of invention include Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices 
Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 62 S.Ct. 37 (1941); Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. 
United States, 320 U.S. I, 63 S.Ct. 1393 (1943); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant 
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 68 S.Ct. 440 (1948); Jungersen v. Ostby &: Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 69 
S.Ct. 269 (1949); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 
U.S. 147, 71 S.Ct. 127 (1950). See comment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 609 (1951); Prager, "Standards 
of Patentable Invention from 1474 to 1952," 20 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 69 (1952). 
29 H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 7 (1952). 
80 (2d Cir. 1955) 106 U.S.P.Q. 1 at 7. 
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continued to be regarded as authoritative. Moreover-and this 
is the important consideration-although it may have ceased 
in practice to be followed, and had come to enjoy no more 
than lip service, there never has been the slightest intimation 
of any definite substitute; nothing more than an unexpressed 
and unacknowledged misgiving about the increased facility 
with which patents were being granted. Such judicial atti-
tudes are indeed the stuff of which much of the law is made; 
but we cannot agree that, however controlling upon the lower 
courts, they are a warrant for that solid assurance, the disap-
pointment of which will make a statute invalid. Courts again 
and again shift their position; and, although they are apt to 
do so under cover of nice distinctions, they impose the risk of 
anticipating the changes upon those who may have acted upon 
the faith of the original. Certainly a legislature, whose will 
the courts have undertaken to proliferate, must be free to 
reinstate the courts' initial interpretation, even though it may 
have been obscured by a series of later comments whose upshot 
is at best hazy." 
"Hard core" protection of valid patents should not give a haven 
to patents which have congenital weakness in failing to meet the 
requirements of patentability. In this regard, competitive policy 
has legitimate ground for scrutiny. Patents that cannot measure 
up to what the patent bar itself would recognize as meritorious in-
ventions should not be permitted to cut down the area of open 
competitive markets, or prove a base for exacting the rewards of 
exclusiveness to which only valid patents are entitled. This is 
primarily a problem of giving wholehearted support in funds and 
personnel to the Patent Office examining corps. Standards of in-
vention applied at this issuance source can rise no higher than their 
level in adequacy of the Patent Office examiners who, despite 
frequent underpay and overwork, have faithfully attempted to keep 
abreast of technological developments in examining the multi-
farious arts. 
Another move in the direction of making the patent grant 
firmer appears in section 282 of the 1952 code, where the statute 
declares, for the first time since 1793, that "a patent shall be pre-
sumed valid. TJ;ie burden of establishing invalidity of a patent 
shall rest on a party asserting it."31 While this presumption had, 
3135 U.S.C. (1952) §282. See note, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 575 (1953); Harris, "Some 
Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act of 1952," 23 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 658 at 680-683 (1955); Schramm, "The Relationship of the Patent Act of 1952 to the 
Antitrust Laws," 23 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 36 at 53-56 (1954). 
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of course, been recognized in many early cases as an application of 
the general rule according presumptive validity to decisions of 
administrative officers, it had been diluted, and even ignored, in 
cases in recent years.32 This evoked Justice Jackson's famous 
dissenting remark that "the only patent that is valid is one which 
this Court ~as not been able to get its hands on."33 In taking 
cognizance of this climate of judicial opinion, Congress expressly 
restated the presumptive validity of the patent. The proper 
stature of meritorious patents should be more securely established 
if the courts perceptively interpret this provision,34 particularly 
in conjunction with section· 103, which provides the criterion of 
"nonobvious subject matter" for invention. 
"Hard core" protection has also been displayed in recent judi-
cial pronouncements that the mere acquisition of a valid patent, or 
mere aggregation of patents is not itself illegal monopolization in 
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. The monopoly exclu-
siveness of the valid patent, whether basic or improvement, and 
even though deliberately obtained or maintained with the purpose 
to exercise the right to exclude all others, is as such immune from 
antitrust prosecution.35 When valid patents are accumulated un-
der on~ ownership or control, that also is not per se an antitrust 
violation.36 This obviously contributes clarification by requiring 
the government or private parties to prove the plus elements of 
abuse of the valid patents, an illegal purpose or plan in their ac-
quisition by grant, purchase or grant back, or a specific intent to 
monopolize beyond the lawful patent grants.37 
32 See Jarozzi Bros., Inc. v. Berkeley Pump Co., (9th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2<l) 632 at 634 
("The presumption of validity of administrative grant has been in recent years almost 
.reduced to nullity in patent cases''); Ginsberg v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., (D.C. N.Y. 
1947) 72 F. Supp. 43 at 44 ("It may now well be said that no presumption whatever arises 
from the grant of a patent"). See note, 21 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 575 (1953). 
33 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 at 572, 69 S.Ct. 269 (1949). 
34 See Harris, "Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act 
of 1952," 23 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 658 (1955). 
35 REPORT 226; United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., (D.C. Del. 1953) 118 
F. Supp. 41 at 214, probable jurisdiction noted 348 U.S. 806 (1954). Cf. Automatic Radio 
Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 70 S.Ct. 894 (1950). See Handler, "An 
Examination of the Chapter on Patent Antitrust Problems in the Attorney General's 
Committee Report," 1 ANTITRU5r BULLETIN 157 at 158 (1955). 
36 United States v. L. D. Caulk Co., (D.C. Del. 1954) 126 F. ·Supp. 693; Automatic 
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 70 S.Ct. 894 (1950). Cf. United 
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 295, affd. per 
curiam 347 U.S. 521, 74 S.Ct. 699 (1954). And see United States v. General Electric Co., 
(D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989 at 1015. 
37 United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989; REPORT 
227. See also cases cited in notes 57-69. 
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Excluding the element of combination or conspiracy on the 
horizontal level of agreement, the courts have not yielded to the 
insistent efforts, coming to a head in the TNEC Final Report, 38 to 
dilute the full measure of the reward to which the patentee has 
been deemed entitled. The courts have not disturbed decisions 
approving limitations in individual patent licenses with respect to 
first sale price,39 quantity,40 field of use41 and territory.42 On-
slaughts on this rationale of normal and reasonable reward, derived 
basically from the 1926 General Electric case, 'have thus failed to 
convert such limitations into either patent law or antitrust viola-
tions, so long as the patentee stays within the metes and bounds of 
the claims of the patent. 
It is also apparent that the combined effect of the Paper Bag43 
and Special Equipment C ompany44 cases, when read with section 
154 of the 1952 Patent Act, evinces congressional intention to ex-
ercise its powers under the constitutional clause without imposing 
on the patentee a compulsion to license, if he does not himself use 
the patent. This "hard core" protection principle may be limited 
by a doctrine of unreasonable nonuse, vaguely foreshadowed in 
the Paper Bag and Special Equipment cases. This would support 
the Attorney General's Committee's observation that mere patent 
nonuse is neutral but, when unreasonable, it may constitute patent 
misuse as well as serve as the instrumentality for antitrust violation 
when the plus antitrust elements are present.45 It should therefore 
put to rest the erroneous view that Paper Bag sanctioned outright 
suppression of a technologically meritorious patented invention 
capable of being worked on a commercially practicable scale. 
38 S. Doc. 35, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941) at 36, 269. 
39 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1926). See United 
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 68 S.Ct. 550 (1948). But see Newburgh Moire 
Co. v. Superior Moire Co., (D.C. N.J. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 372. 
40 Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., (7th Cir. 1907) 154 F. 
358, app. dismissed 210 U.S. 439, 28 S.Ct. 764 (1908). 
41 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 305 U.S. 124, 59 S.Ct. 116 
(1938). Cf. Vulcan Mfg. Co. v. Maytag Co., (8th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 136, cert. den. 294 
U.S. 734, 55 S.Ct. 403 (1935). 
42 Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., (9th Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 121. See Adams 
v. Burke, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 453 (1873); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 
15 S.Ct. 738 (1895); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Eisele & Co., (6th Cir. 1936) 86 F. (2d) 267. 
43 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 28 S.Ct. 748 
(1908). 
44 Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 65 S.Ct. 741 (1945). 
45 REPORT 229-231. Cf. Frost, "Legal Incidents of Non-Use of Patented Inventions 
Reconsidered," 14 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 273, 435 (1946); Stemple, "Non-User of Paper 
Patents,'' 34 J.P.O.S. 23 (1952); Powell, "The Exclusive Right of the Patentee-Should the 
Right to Exclude Others Be Dependent on Sale or Licensing by the Patentee?" 58 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 726 (1945). 
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"Hard Core" Violations 
Of coordinate importance with "hard core" protection of law-
ful patent rights is <;:ondemnation of "hard core" violations of 
either patent or antitrust policy. As stated at the beginning of 
this paper, drawing the line between these categories may involve 
discriminating judgment and a sensitive balance. Exactitude of 
a slide rule is a delusory expectation. Yet it is generally recognized 
that there are certain practices which cannot be defended in the 
name of patents. Motion Picture Patents46 laid the foundation 
stones of patent misuse as a violation of patent law policy. The 
Supreme Court from the Bement41 and Winslow48 cases to date 
demarcated patent and antitrust areas. It is fair to conclude that 
the whole body of Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions 
has appreciably contributed to clarification in identifying and 
measuring the scope of genuine patent misuse and antitrust abuses. 
On the Supreme Court level, exceptions to this generalization are 
the Mercoid cases49 and the confusing expressions in certain Su-
preme Court opinions equating patent misuse and patent tying 
clauses to a per se antitrust violation.50 Excluded also from this 
analysis are boundary cases of first impression which may pose 
problems in growth areas for which the solution may at first be 
quite obscure. 
In the areas where authentic instances of patent misuse and 
antitrust abuse have been crystallized into "hard core" violations, 
both the patent and antitrust bars should have no qualms in sub-
scribing to the Attorney General's Committee's forthright approval 
of the outlawing of such transgressions.51 Government and prac-
titioners have a common goal in curbing these abuses. Motion 
Picture Patents}2 Carbice,53 Leitch,54 Morton Salt55 and B. B. 
46 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 37 S.Ct. 416 
(1917). 
47 Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 22 S.Ct. 747 (1902). 
48 United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 33 S.Ct. 253 (1913). 
49 Mercoid Corp v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S.Ct. 268 (1944); 
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 64 S.Ct. 278 (1944). 
50 Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 at 684, 64 
S.Ct. 278 (1944). Cf. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 at 396, 68 S.Ct. 
12 (1947); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 73 S.Ct. 872 (1953). 
51 REPORT, c. V. 
52 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 37 S.Ct. 416 
(1917). 
53 Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 51 
S.Ct. 334 (1931). 
54 Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 288 (1938). 
55 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S.Ct. 402 (1942). 
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Chemical56 are supportable patent misuse cases. The Mercoid 
cases are, in my opinion, exceptions. In the antitrust area of com-
bination or conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade and at-
tempts to monopolize through abuse of patent rights, the courts, 
since 1936, have defined a number of "hard core" violations. Illus-
trative cases, viewed from the standpoint of proof of violation 
rather than the remedies decreed by the court, are Ethyl Gasoline,67 
Vehicular Parking,58 Masonite,5 9 Hartford-Empire, 60 National 
Lead,61 United States Gypsum,62 General Electric Lamp63 and 
Carboloy64 cases, Imperial Chemical Industries,66 Besser Manufac-
turing,66 New Wrinkle,C1 Kobe v. Dempsey68 and Associated Pat-
ents.69 Aside from the dedication of patents in the General Elec-
tric Lamp case, none of these cases need disturb those who fear 
deterioration of patent law fundamentals through the judicial 
process. In 1955 this can be seen i!l calmer and clearer perspective. 
It was not these successful patent misuse and antitrust prosecutions 
that primarily accounted for the gale of criticism from the patent 
bar. Rather it was the ideological assault on the fundamentals of 
patent laws and the Patent System.70 This assault occurred during 
the very period when the antitrust division was engaged in a syste-
matic and more intensified scrutiny of patent-antitrust abuses. 
This scrutiny in turn generated a tendency to find in genuine 
antitrust fact situations the aura of an anti-patent government 
attitude. 
Corporate bigness in patents is not per se an evil, and bigness 
should be carefully distinguished from monopolization.71 Yet the 
56 B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 62 S.Ct. 406 (1942). 
57 Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 60 S.Ct. 618 (1940). 
58 United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., (D.C. Del. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 828. 
59 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 62 S.Ct. 1070 (1942). 
60 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1944). 
61 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947). 
62 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948). 
63 United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753. 
64 United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989. 
65 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 
504. 
66 Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444, 72 S.Ct. 838 (1952). 
67 United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 72 S.Ct. 350 (1952); (D.C. Ohio 
1955) 1955 Trade Cases ,r67,883. 
68 Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., (10th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 416, cert. den. 344 
U.S. 837, 73 S.Ct. 46 (1952). Cf. Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., (10th Cir. 1954) 219 F. (2d) 
924 at 935-936. 
69 Associated Patents, Inc. v. United States, (D.C. Mich. 1955), 1955 Trade Cases 
fi68,092. 
70 See note 8 supra. 
71 See notes 35-37 supra. 
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thought may be ventured that corporations are sometimes too 
ambitious in swelling patent portfolios with a mass of patents for 
"insurance" purposes in the race of competitive rivalry in inven-
tions. Consideration might be given to the mutual benefits an 
industry may reap through a sense of foresighted self-restraint 
regarding corporate massing of many "deadwood" patents at the 
expense of a portfolio made up of high-quality patents. It is a 
question of avoiding an over-drive in competition in patents and 
recognizing that excessive concentration of patents may invite 
special scrutiny by antitrust enforcement agencies. 
Borderland Issues 
In the growth of any branch of the law, there are bound to be 
stages when the courts plant seeds in cases of first impression which 
may or may not sprout into firm. precedents. This is illustrated in 
the patent-antitrust field by decisions or dicta which have not yet 
come to maturity in balancing the private and public interests 
to be secured within the limits of policy standards. 
The Mercoid cases provide one example. There is no need to 
traverse familiar ground amply covered in law review critiques of 
this- spasmodic effect upon the contributory infringement doc-
trine.72 The Attorney General's Committee properly emphasized 
"the need for limitations upon the scope of the misuse doctrine to 
place contributory infringement in the proper context of joint 
tort rules generally."73 Again the Patent Code of 1952 purports 
to counteract the effects of Justice Douglas' animadversions on this 
historic remedy for actively inducing patent infringement. Sec-
tion 271, particularly subsections (c) and (d),74 should make of 
contributory infringement more than the residuum Justice Doug-
las thought the Mercoid. rationale left for a treasure hunt. It may 
well be said that section 271, in the words of the Attorney General's 
72 E.g., Wood, "The Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications," 13 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 61 
(1944); Frost, "Patent Infringement and the Public Interest," 12 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 345 
(1944); Waite, "Has The Doctrine of Contributory Infringement Been Repudiated?" 42 
MICH. L. REv. 915 (1944); Powell, "Use of Common-Law Techniques and Remedies in 
Statutory Enforcement-A Study in Judicial Behavior,'' 57 HARV. L. REv. 900 (1944); Wiles, 
"Joint Trespasses on Patent Property,'' 30 A.B.A.J. 454 (1944); Mathews, "Contributory 
Infringement and the Mercoid Case," 27 J.P.O.S. 260 (1945); comment, 39 ILL. L. REv. 
55 (1944); Rich, "Contributory Infringement,'' 31 J.P.O.S. 449 (1949); Eastman, "Con-
tributory Infringement and the Combination Patent,'' 48 MICH. L. REv. 183 (1949). 
73 REPORT 252. 
74 35 U.S.C. (1952) §271. See Rich, "Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent 
Act of 1952," 21 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 521 (1953); Frost, "Misuse of Patents in Relation to 
the Patent Code,'' UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAw SCHOOL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
LAws 7I (1953); note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1953). 
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Committee, reflects "reasonable expressions of Congressional inten-
tion"70 to clarify these points: (a) an express sanction of contribu-
tory infringement and an affirmation that resort to that action is 
not in itself patent misuse; and (b) a cutting down of the breadth 
of the Mercoid case implications, so that if the unpatented element 
of a patented combination is the heart of the invention and has no 
other substantial use, contributory infringement relief would not 
be denied. It is hoped that the Dr. Salsbury' s Laboratories76 deci-
sion, in its confusing interpretations of section 271, will not set off 
a nullification of the congressional objective of making contribu-
tory infringement a meaningful remedy. 
Associated with the second Mercoid case are dicta of Justice 
Douglas which would invariably equate patent misuse with per se 
antitrust violation.77 This is another thrust of liability to which 
the patentee should not be subjected. An owner of patent rights 
should be answerable for antitrust misdeeds when, as in the case 
of any other mvner of property, his conduct transgresses the stand-
ards of the Sherman, Federal Trade Commission or Clayton Acts, 
as distinct from subversion of the public policy underlying the 
patent grant. 
Another cognate border question is whether the patentee 
should be adjudged guilty of patent misuse only when the patent 
is itself the efficient instrumentality of the challenged business 
practice. Exclusive dealing arrangements or price discrimination 
in violation of the Clayton Act may be practiced in marketing 
patented products but this alone would not necessarily make the 
conduct attributable solely or substantially to misuse of the patent 
covering the product.78 
Still another quirk on the edges of misuse is the notion that 
every patent is a dynamo for generating market power requisite 
to antitrust illegality. This has been given credence and authority 
in the tying clause cases.79 The Attorney General's Committee 
75 REPORT 253. 
76 Dr. Salsbury's Laboratories v. I. D. Russell Co. Laboratories, (8th Cir. 1954) 212 F. 
(2d) 414, cert. den. 348 U.S. 837, 75 S.Ct. 50 (1954). 
77 Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 at 684, 64 
S.Ct. 278 (1944). 
78 REPORT 251. See F. C. Russell Co. v. Comfort Equipment Corp., (7th Cir. 1952) 194 
F. (2d) 592; F. C. Russell Co. v. Consumers Insulation Co., (D.C. N.J. 1954) ll9 F. Supp. 
II9, affd. (3d Cir. 1955), 1955 Trade Cases '1!68,177. 
79 See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12 (1947); Times-
Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 at 601, 73 S.Ct. 872 (1953); United States 
v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 at 522, 68 S.Ct. II07 (1948). But see Standard Oil Co. 
of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 at 307, 69 S.Ct. 1051 (1949) (" .•• A patent, 
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asserts that the market leverage of a patent depends on an examina-
tion of the entire factual market context.80 This properly allows for 
weighing the qualitative importance of the patent and the presence 
or absence of competitive substitutes in patented or unpatented 
subject matter. 
Other doctrines still in the margin of development and hence 
not fully integrated are merely mentioned here. Non-coercive 
package licensing for legitimate business purposes is still in flux 
because of the absence of case law marking out its scope and lim-
itations. 81 Questions still remain as to what amounts to a unilateral 
refusal to deal in less than the package, what are elements of duress 
with respect to the package versus per piece royalty rates, and the 
extent to which the package licensor is obligated to assist a prospec-
tive licensee in selecting the patents making up the package. 
The lawful limits of grant backs have not yet been established 
by precedents which spell out the implications of Transparent-
W rap82 and, at the same time, are separated from the antitrust 
remedial aspects with which the grant back has figured in a num-
ber of cases.83 Other unsettled questions concern the legal criteria 
for interchange of patent rights, relating to administration and 
operations of the interchange. These have not been fully clarified 
in the Oil Cracking Process case84 and subsequent cases applying 
its Rule-of-Reason rationale.85 Connected with this is the need for 
clarification of doctrine applicable to a simple cross-license to 
moreover, although in fact there may be many competing substitutes for the patented 
article, is at least prima facie evidence of ... [market] •.. control.''). 
80 REPORT 238. 
81See REPORT 239-240; note, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61 (1952). 
82 Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 67 S.Ct. 610 
(1947). 
83 Compare United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835 
at 847; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 at 
409; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1945) with United 
:States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 at 359, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947). And see United 
:States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 989 at 1005; United States v. 
General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753 at 815; and United States v. E. I. 
DuPont De Nemours & Co., (D.C. Del. 1953) 118 F. Supp. 41 at 151, 154, 158, 224 (cases 
in which grant backs were considered as one factor in determining whether there was 
antitrust violation). See also Houdry Process Corp. v. Sinclair Refining Corp., (D.C. Pa. 
1954) 121 F. Supp. 320; Modem Art Printing Co. v. Skeels, (D.C. N.J. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 
426 at 433. 
84 Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 51 S.Ct. 421 (1931). See 
notes, 50 CoL. L. REv. 1113 (1950); 17 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 357 (1950). 
85 Cutter_ Laboratories v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., (9th Cir. 1949) 179 F. (2d) 80; 
Baker-Cammack Hosiery Mills v. Davis Co., (4th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 550. 
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determine when its purpose and effect promote rather than lessen 
competition in the line of art. It has seemed to me that Line 
Material86 blurred rather than clarified the distinction between the 
vertical and horizontal relationships of a simple cross-license agr~e-
ment. 
Another area not yet completely mapped is the range of ex-
ceptions to the general rule estopping licensees and assignors to 
deny the validity of licensed or assigned patents. This pro?lem is 
illustrated by the Sola,87 Scott Paper,88 Katzinger,89 MacGregor,90 
Hazeltine,91 and National Transformer92 and Hall Laboratories93 
cases. This area will probably continue to undergo case-by-case 
development, particularly in view of the new statutory presump-
tion of validity.94 A related question of undefined bounds is the 
standing of the government to attack the validity of patents in an 
antitrust proceeding, discussed in the first Gypsum case.95 
Finally, there are unresolved borderland questions of use of 
patents in the foreign commerce field. The overall unlawful pur-
pose and means found in cases such as National Lead06 and I mpe-
rial Chemical Industries97 did not call upon the courts to adjudicate 
the legality of restraints within the claims of valid patents and rea-
86 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 68 S.Ct. 550 (1948). 
87 Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 63 S.Ct. 172 (1942). 
88 Scott Paper Co. v. l\farcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 66 S.Ct. 101 (1945). 
89 Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 67 S.Ct. 416 (1947). 
90 MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 67 S.Ct. 421 (1947). 
91Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 70 S.Ct. 894 
(1950). 
92 National Transformer Corp. v. France Mfg. Co., (6th Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 343. 
93 Hall Laboratories v. National Aluminate Corp., (3d Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 303. 
94 35 u.s.c. (1952) §282. 
95 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 at 386, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948). 
96 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947). 
97 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 504. 
See REPORT 84-86. 
Still controversial is the question whe~er compulsory licensing royalty-free is within 
the Sherman Act remedies when antitrust violation is found. A majority of the Attorney 
General's Committee deemed this remedy "beyond the Sherman Act's authority to 'prevent 
and restrain' violations." A substantial minority of committee members disagreed with 
this position. The pros and cons are presented in the REPORT 255-259. The majority of 
the committee, while recognizing the difficulties "inherent in compulsory licensing at 
reasonable rates," felt it is settled that this remedy can be decreed but that it "should be 
employed in accord with relevant standards for use of divestiture," as stated at 355-356 of 
the Report. For other discussions, see Seegert, "Compulsory Licensing By Judicial Action-
A Remedy for Misuse of Patents," 47 MICH. L. REv. 613 (1949); notes, 19 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 400 (1951); 56 YALE L.J. 77 (1946). Compare Stedman, "Patent and Trade-Mark 
Relief in Antitrust Judgments," IO FED. B.J. 260 (1949). 
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sonably ancillary to a lawful main purpose. This still leaves a void 
in the case law. 
Ideological Currents 
This brings us to the last category of developments, namely, 
ideological zones of thought drifting away from the orbits of "hard 
core" protection of lawful patent rights, condemnation of "hard 
core" antitrust violations, and normal borderland questions. We 
refer to the realm of premises and standards outside the declared 
congressional and judicial precepts of competitive enterprise. This 
writer has previously referred to the school of thought which would 
resolve all doubts against validity and scope of patent rights-on the 
fallacious premise that they are intrinsically in opposition to the 
public interest in open markets.98 This assumption, bolstered by 
instances of patent misuse and antitrust abuse, has, we believe, 
been the source of the ideological attacks upon patents in the late 
1930's and the 1940's.99 Judicial notice of this was taken by Judge 
Jerome Frank when he warned against succumbing to the "monop-
oly phobia," which, like mo_st phobias, he said, is "both a symptom 
and a cause of a neurotic tendency which, in refusing bravely to 
face facts, cannot yield intelligent advice."100 He also cautioned 
that by a process of "osmosis" trade-marks and other forms of 
industrial and intellectual property would be affected by this ideo-
logical current.101 Even one as understanding of patent rights as 
Judge Learned Hand suggested, "Perhaps the [patent] system is 
outworn .... "102 
From the survey of trends traced•in this paper, it seems that the 
principal reason for the brooding of the patent bar over certain 
developments since the 1930's has been the ideological variances 
from the fundamentals of patent laws and the Patent System. This 
has tended to obscure the rather promising record of congressional 
and judicial balance and respect for the fitting of patent law into 
a workable patent and antitrust policy aimed at a workable com-
petition policy.103 In saying this, there is no intention to minimize 
98 See "The Public Interest in Legal Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Prop-
erty," 40 TRADE MARK REP. 613 at 614-617 (1950); "A New Approach to Evaluation of the 
American Patent System," 33 J.P.O.S. 555, 564-565 (1951). 
99 See note 8 supra. 
100 Standard Brands v. Smidler, (2d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 34 at 42. 
101 Id. at 41. 
102 Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. Mimex Co., (2d Cir. 1942) 124 F. (2d) 986 at 990. 
103 See discussion in Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a 
Revised National Antitrust Policy," 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 at 1213-1216 (1952). 
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the unsettled problems which still remain and which perhaps are 
unavoidable in an expanding economy. On the other hand, there 
should be no mental distress merely because a particular decision 
involving a new application of established doctrine seems to be 
out of line with one's mm evaluation. 
The limited time exclusiveness of patent rights is derived from 
the tenet that it serves the public welfare to give such protection 
to the patent grant as a mechanism for sustaining incentives to 
invent, to disclose and to invest.104 When the many pieces of the 
trends described in this paper are put together, it seems that we 
are witnessing the beginning of a better perception of the role of 
patent and antitrust policies i~ the total American economy. These 
two arms of the preeminent policy of maintaining competition 
presently appear to be in better equipoise. If we are in the cycle 
where this wise middle course is being pursued, this is the time for 
private parties and government to continue to support both "hard 
core" protection of patents and strong but equitable enforcement 
against "hard core" subversions of patents and antitrust policy. 
This is also the time to continue to cast out ideologies at variance 
with constitutional and statutory directives in both spheres of 
policy. Particularly, there should be no retreat from the necessity 
for inquiry into market facts and competitive market effects under 
the Rule of Reason when the challenged conduct of the patentee 
cannot "quickly and positively" be adjudged as unreasonable per 
se in the limited number of such unequivocal situations.105 
Government, business and the bar should join in solidifying 
their common interest in this approach to patent-antitrust state-
craft. The launching in February 1954 of The George Washington 
University Patent, Trade-Mark and Copyright Foundation106 un-
derscores the important task of research projects to fill factual gaps 
regarding the structure, operations and accomplishments of the 
Patent System. Pilot projects of the Foundation are now in process 
on patent utilization, the·value of the patent in the United States, 
the effect of patents on the creation and growth of small industrial 
units, licensing of American patents and techniques in foreign 
104For the author's beliefs, see note 98 supra. See WooD, PATENTS AND ANrrmusr 
I.Aw (1942) and Wood and Johnson, "Patents and Antitrust Laws," UNIV. !LL. L. FORUM 
544 (1950); Wood, "Patent Reform and 1943: Antitrust or Anti-Patent Law" II GEo. 
WASH. L. REv. 473 (1943). 
105 R.EPoRT, II, 86 and c. V. 
lOBThe University has published a brochure on THE PATENT FOUNDATION and a pam-
phlet containing the terms of the DECLARATION OF TRusr EsrABLJSHING THE FOUNDATION. 
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countries, and public attitude toward patents.107 As these and 
other Foundation projects are completed, this fact supporting art 
of legal and economic evaluation of significant phases of the Amer-
ican Patent System should contribute materially to a better under-
standing of this long existing institution of our society. 
If the thesis of this paper has correctly evaluated the trends, it 
may be concluded that patent~ and antitrust can lead a peaceful 
coexistence. In that way, lawful private rights in patents and the 
objectives of the antitrust laws can flourish side by side in fulfill-
ment of the public interest. 
101 These current pilot projects are described in the FouNDATION's RllPoRT No. 2 TO 
ITS MEMBERS AND DONORS, April 18, 1955. 
A pioneer work on economic aspects is VAUGHAN, THE ECONOMICS OF OUR p ATENT 
SYSTEM (1925). More recent are Forkosch, "The Economics of American Patent Law," 17 
N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. R.Ev. 157,406 (1940); Abramson, "The Economic Bases of Patent Reform," 
13 LAW&: CONTEM. PROB. 339 (1948); BENNEIT, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM (1943); and 
the PRINCETON UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE ON QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE (1950). 
